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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78A-3-102(3)(j) and 78A-4-103(2)(j)? and pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly quashed the service of process on 
Defendant Jonathen Kraft attempted through Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-505 (2006) 
in its ruling and order dated May 18, 2009. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion to serve 
Defendant Jonathen Kraft after the afore-mentioned order and after the last 
extension of time to serve had expired as set forth in the trial court's ruling and 
order of July 17,2009. 
3. Whether the trial court properly dismissed this matter in its ruling 
and order of July 17, 2009. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation of a procedural rule is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, % 10, 1 P.3d 1087 (citing Ostler v. 
Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 5, 989 P.2d 1073). The interpretation of a statute is also a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. .See Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, 
% 19, 191 P.3d 1242. "When reviewing [a ruling on] a motion for involuntary 
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dismissal, an appellate court should defer to the trial court's findings and 
inferences under a clearly erroneous standard and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness.*' Markliam v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, % 
13, 173 P.3d 865. Finally, as Rule 4 encompasses jurisdictional issues, rulings of 
the trial court are reviewed under a coiTection of error standard. See Bonneville 
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
41-12a-505. Effect upon nonresident of use of state highways. 
(1) (a) The use and operation by a nonresident or his agent, or of a resident 
who has departed Utah, of a motor vehicle on Utah highways is an 
appointment of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as the 
true and lawful attorney for service of legal process in any action or 
proceeding against the person arising from the use or operation of a motor 
vehicle over Utah highways which use or operation results in damages or 
loss to person or property. 
(b) The use or operation referenced in Subsection (1) is an agreement that 
process shall, in any action against the person in which there is such 
service, be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon him 
personally in Utah. 
(2) (a) Service of process under Subsection (1) is made by serving a copy 
upon the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code or by filing a 
copy in that office with payment of a reasonable fee. 
(b) The plaintiff shall, within 10 days after service of process, send notice 
of the process together with plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this 
section to the defendant by registered mail at the defendant's last-known 
address. 
(3) (a) The court in which the action is pending may order any 
continuance necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to 
defend the action, but not exceeding 90 days from the date of filing the 
action in court. 
(b) The reasonable fee paid by the plaintiff to the Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code is taxed as costs if the plaintiff prevails. 
(c) The division shall keep a record of all process served showing the day 
and hour of service. 
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Rule 4. Process, (Relevant Portion) 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons 
and complaint shall be by one of the following methods: 
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any 
state or judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or 
by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's 
deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the person to 
be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be 
sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the name of the process 
and offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as 
follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs 
(B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the 
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service of process; 
(d)(4) Other service. 
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where 
service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person 
to be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order 
allowing sendee by publication or by some other means. The supporting 
affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the 
party to be served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to 
serve all of the individual parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case originates from an automobile accident that occurred August 31, 
2000. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The matter had been dismissed previously for failure to serve. (R. 110, 
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The matter was re-filed and nine extensions 
were requested and granted before the first attempt at service, done through the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, was made in this matter. (R. 110 
- 1 1 1 , Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17-21). That service was quashed by order 
of the trial Court on May 18, 2009. (R. 110-115, Addendum to Plaintiffs* Brief 
17 - 18). Plaintiffs then filed a motion to serve by alternative means, which was 
denied and in its denial of that motion the trial court dismissed this matter. (R. 
135-138, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13-16). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The matter of the underlying suit stems from an automobile accident which 
occurred on August 31, 2006. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The 
first filing of the suit was dismissed on April 8, 2005 for failure to serve. (R. 110, 
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The present action was filed on March 30, 
2006. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). Plaintiffs requested and 
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received nine extensions for time in which to serve, the last of which was a sixty-
day extension granted on December 11, 2008. (R. 110 - 111, Addendum to 
Plaintiffs' Brief 17-18). On Januaiy 29, 2009, Plaintiffs served this matter on the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-
12a-505 (2006). (R. 111, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 18). Defendant, through 
counsel filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to quash the service of 
process. (R. I l l , Addendum to Plaintiffs5 Brief 18). The trial court found that at 
not time prior to service had the Plaintiffs requested permission to serve in the 
manner and granted the motion in the alternative and quashed the service. (R. 110 
- 115, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17 - 20). 
Plaintiffs then filed a motion for alternative service on June 15, 2009. (R. 
135, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13). The trial court found that the time for 
effectuating service had past and recounted the extensions that had been provided 
to Plaintiffs. (R. 135 - 136, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13 - 14.) The Court 
then dismissed this matter on its own motion for failure to timely serve a 
defendant in this matter. (R. 138, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
All the factual findings of the trial court should be accepted as true as they 
remained unchallenged by Plaintiffs. Accepting those finding as true, this Court 
should first find that trial court properly quashed service in this matter when 
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Plaintiffs tried to effect service on Defendant through the Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code. If Plaintiffs did not know the location of Defendant or if 
they believed him to be non-resident, they are required to first meet a due 
diligence requirement. The trial court then properly denied their motion for 
alternative service as it was not filed timely and if it had jurisdiction to grant the 
motion, it was still not warranted based the inaction of Plaintiffs. Without timely 
service having been accomplished, the trial court properly dismissed the case 
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Ail Facts are Undisputed in this Matter. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the factual findings of the trial court in either of the 
trial courts' rulings and orders of May 18, 2009 or July 17, 2009. Accordingly, 
the issues before this Court are whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 4, 
Section 41-12a-505, and controlling case law. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Quashed Service on May 18, 2009, 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs served the Defendant pursuant to the 
requirements of this statute, but did so before any showing of need for alternative 
service or seeking leave to do so. Plaintiffs' argument in this matter is that they 
are not required by Rule 4 to seek the trial court's permission or to make any 
showing to the trial court before utilizing the service process outlined by Section 
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41-12a-505. The trial court, in its ruling, relied on the holding of Carlson v. Bos, 
740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme Court held, as noted in the trial 
court's ruling, that a plaintiff must show "that diligent efforts have been made to 
locate the defendant. Only by making a satisfactory showing of diligence can such 
a plaintiff satisfy" due process requirements. Id. at 1276. That case interpreted 
the predecessor statute to Section 4 l-12a-505, which was Section 41-12-8. The 
Utah Court of Appeals repeated this language in context of Rule 4(g) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 773 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
Plaintiffs do not argue the holdings of cases, but argue that they were 
effecting service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)(A) and that the agent identified in this 
portion of Rule includes the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 
However, the portion of Rule 4(g) that was the subject of the Bonneville Billing 
matter contains identical language of the current Rule 4(d)(4)(A). In Bonneville 
Billing, the Utah Court of Appeals quoted Rule 4(g): "Where the identity or 
whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained 
through reasonable diligence ..., the party seeking service of process may file a 
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication, 
by mail, or by some other means." Id. at 773. Here, the present language of Rule 
4(d)(4)(a) set forth above is identical. 
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Iii sum, the present language of Rule 4 is unchanged. Both the Carlson and 
Bonneville Billing cases require that Plaintiff first make the due diligence showing 
to the Court before alternative service may be effected. Because Plaintiffs failed 
to make the requisite showing prior to utilizing the subject statute, the trial court 
correctly quashed service. 
3. The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
Alternative Service. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly denied their motion for 
alternative service. Plaintiffs rely on Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor. Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) for the proposition that this 
case for the proposition that it would be an abuse of discretion for the Court to 
have denied their motion. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial 
court had a wide range of discretion for dismissing a matter for failure to 
prosecute. See id. at 878-79. However, the Supreme Court noted that this 
discretion was tempered with conditions to prevent a trial court from acting 
arbitrarily. See id. at 879. Plaintiffs then recite the factors set forth in this case 
and argue only that dismissal in this case was improper an injustice will result. 
First, if the trial court properly quashed service in this matter, then the time 
to serve had expired before Plaintiffs' filed their motion for alternative service. 
The Court had explicitly informed the Plaintiff that no more extensions were 
forthcoming in December of 2008. (R. 23 - 24). As Plaintiffs did not request an 
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extension of time for service and failed to file this motion for alternative service 
with the time allotted by the trial court, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant 
the motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (stating, as noted by the trial court, if no 
party is served timely "the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on 
application of any party or upon the court's own initiative."). The term "shall" 
provides no discretion to the trial court. Defendant had not been served within the 
requisite time period allowed the trial court and Rule and the action had to be 
dismissed. 
Second, assuming that the trial court could hear the motion for alternative 
service and had the discretion to make the determination, Plaintiffs' argument fails 
as the trial court did not abuse its discretion if this Court looks to the 
Westinghouse standards. First, unlike Westinghouse, the unusual factors, if any, 
weigh against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the present action only after a previous 
dismissal for failure to prosecute. The present matter was filed on March 30, 
2006. Plaintiffs requested and were granted, nine extensions, the last of which 
would have expired on February 10, 2009. These extensions extend well beyond 
the 120 days explicitly provided for by Rule 4. In fact, reviewing these dates, 
Plaintiffs had almost 3 years to serve any defendant in this matter. 
Of course this fact weighs against Plaintiffs' first factor to be considered. 
Plaintiffs' only attempt at service came at the end of the almost three years in 
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which they had time to act. That is inaction and Defendant, in contrast, had no 
conduct with which to compare. The same is true of the second factor. Plaintiffs 
had their initial time in the first filing to serve and almost three years in which to 
attempt service on their second filing. They had every opportunity to serve or to 
timely seek alternative service. As to the difficulty factor, the trial court noted in 
its Ruling and Order of May 2009, that Plaintiffs lost track of Defendants. (R. I l l , 
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 18). That finding is unchallenged. In some, the 
difficulty faced by Plaintiffs in now locating the Defendant is one they brought 
upon themselves. Finally, the motion should be denied as the motion would have 
allowed service some three and half years after the filing of the second action and 
nine and half years after the subject accident.1 Obviously, any defendant would be 
prejudiced if he were forced to defend an action which is based on facts that 
occurred nine years before. Therefore, if this Court determines that the trial court 
had discretion to rule on the motion, it should find that the trial court acted within 
that discretion when it denied the motion. 
4. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed this Matter-
As set forth in Part 3 above, the trial court properly quashed service and 
denied the motion for alternative service. As stated, Rule 4 mandates dismissal if 
1
 As noted in the trial court's ruling of May 2009, Defendant did raise the due 
process issues involved in the trial courts' numerous extensions in this matter. As 
the dismissal was not based on those grounds, it is not examined here. 
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a party fails to timely serve a defendant in the case. It shall do so upon a motion 
of a party or on its own initiative once service is not timely effected.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, all the ruling of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED THIS 29TH DAY OF 
W. KEVTNTANNER 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLEE JON ATHEN KRAFT 
2
 Defendant Jonathen Kraft acknowledges that Rule 4 is a dismissal without 
prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the Court. It is correct that if the matter 
were refiled and served, Defendant would seek dismissal on due process grounds 
relating to the extensions given in this case. However, that issue is not before this 
Court as the motion to dismiss was a sua sponte motion by the trial court. 
Plaintiffs have taken the position that the dismissal was with prejudice. 
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